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INTRODUCTION
More than fifty years ago, in 1946, the victorious World War II
Allies, represented by the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France, came together in Washington to meet with the Swiss Government. This was to be the first of a series of meetings with the
states that had remained neutral in the war. These talks dealt with
several issues:
reparation for the great losses suffered as a consequence of
aggression and occupation;
Professor Emeritus in Residence at the American University Washington
College of Law. Professor Rubin was Deputy Chief of the American Delegation
during the negotiations of the Washington Accord.
*

1. This article first appeared in Translex (TransnationalLan,Erchange). Oct.
1998, at 11 and Dec. 1998 (forthcoming), carried in two installments. The first installment covered background information on the Washington Accord. its implementation and reevaluation. The second installment will cover recent events and
concluding remarks. See <http://www.transnationalpubs.com>.
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*

restitution of the enormous amount of property looted by the
Nazis, including not only war booty, but also properties extracted, in various ways, from persecuted persons, mainly but
by no means exclusively Jews; and
* security, by elimination of the threat of a postwar Nazi resurgence supported by German external assets or influence.
The third of these objectives-security-now seems anomalous.
The sea tide of history has converted Germany to ally from dreaded
enemy capable-as the post-Versailles era had proved-of a new
rise from the ashes of defeat. External assets had powered that rise,
as well as facilitating espionage, sabotage, and propaganda. The lessons of the Sudetenland and of Austrian Anschluss were fresh in
mind. Elimination of German external assets could be taken for
granted in Allied nations, but the neutrals-Switzerland most of
all-were a problem. These then were the raison d'tre and essential
components of the positions taken and demands made by the Allies
in the discussions with the neutrals.
Contrary to common belief (and the arguments of the neutrals), the
issues had less to do with the international law of neutrality than with
Allied status as the successor government in Germany, and with
commonly accepted norms of ownership and of the right to recover
stolen-that is looted-property, particularly from one who takes in
bad faith.

I. THE PARIS REPARATIONS AGREEMENTJANUARY 1946
In Washington, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France spoke on behalf of all the Allied nations, other than the USSR
(for which other reparations arrangements had been agreed at
Potsdam). Their claims were based on a series of international
agreements-Yalta, Potsdam, and Paris.
In early 1945 at Yalta, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had come
together to decide on postwar policies-and to divide responsibility
for what had been the German world. There, it was agreed that a special meeting to deal with reparations policy would be convened in
Moscow, in the spring of 1945. That session was postponed as a result of the April 1945 death of Roosevelt, and eventually convened
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only in July. By that date the Potsdam Summit was imminent, and
the Soviets had decided that the matter of reparations was so intimately connected to major allocations of power, that it should be put
off to the upcoming Potsdam Conference-to be held at the level of
Heads of Government, not the mere Ambassadors who had been
designated for the Moscow session.
At Potsdam, where the East-West division which was to dominate
world politics for generations was established, the reparations programs for the USSR and for the West were separated. Essentially, the
USSR was given a free hand to extract reparations from that part of
Europe which it dominated-the Soviet-occupied Eastern Zones of
Germany and Austria, and the Balkan satellite nations, together with
a share in Berlin (which lay within the Soviet Zone). The three
Western powers were to deal with reparations from their occupation
zones. Additionally, the Western powers would, on behalf of the Allies, take title to and responsibility for all German external assets in
the neutral nations.
The Allied Control Commission (ACC) in Germany-USSR, UK,
France and the United States-considered itself to be both de facto
and dejure government of Germany. It considered, in accord with
the Potsdam agreement, that it had a legal right, for reparation or security purposes, to German external assets. Exercising these rights,
the Allied Control Commission enacted its Law No. 5. That law,
which was similar to many state enactments taking control of foreign
exchange, became the foundation of the Allied claim to German private external assets in the neutral countries. (Parenthetically, it was
also the foundation of the Soviet claim in the area assigned to it at
Potsdam. Not surprisingly, there was no audible protest from the
Balkans).
Before its enactment there was, however, considerable debate
among the Allies as to the wisdom of Law No. 5. This debate was
mainly between the British and the American sides. The British
raised two points.
The first was the legality, under international law, of a taking by
any government of the private foreign holdings of its nationals.
Moreover, the ACC was not a normal government, but an occupying
power exercising government authority by virtue of military victory.
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The second British doubt was based on the anticipated neutral resistance to any legal claim which might be equated to expropriation
of private property. The UK thought there was a better chance of attaining the Allied objectives of control, liquidation, and transfer of
proceeds to the reparation account by negotiation. Law No. 5, it was
argued, would give rise to resistance on the ground that it violated
international law. This contention might be avoided by a more diplomatic and less legalistic approach.
The American response was that control over German external assets could hardly be obtained in the absence of some legal assertion
of Allied rights, and that a law was the normal and probably indispensable method of making claim to title. Moreover, the Americans
reminded their Allies that ample precedent existed for taking control
of privately held foreign exchange. The British, indeed, had themselves required their nationals to turn dollar holdings over to the
British Treasury during the war, in order to finance essential purchases-especially prior to lend-lease. Many nations imposed constraints on the foreign exchange holdings of their nationals. Nor was
this practice regarded as confiscatory and/or violative of international
law. Just as the British had compensated their nationals in sterling, so
it was contemplated that German nationals would be compensated in
German currency.
The British arguments were not without plausibility. Indeed, the
neutrals later uniformly contested the international legal effectiveness of Law No. 5 and the Allied claim to German external assets
(including on occasion public as well as private assets) on much the
same grounds. Nevertheless, the American thesis prevailed, was incorporated in ACC Law No. 5, and became the legal foundation of
the subsequent Allied-neutral negotiations. Continuing doubts, however, may have led the British and French negotiators to be more attracted to compromise in those negotiations than were the Americans.
Enactment of Allied Control Commission Law No. 5 was followed
by the Paris Reparations Conference of January 1946. The Paris
Agreement allocated shares of reparations from Germany. First, it affirmed the right of each Ally to retain German assets within its own
territory. It then established shares in anticipated reparation payments. It made explicit provisions to deal with the troublesome issue
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of the "Restitution of Monetary Gold." It set up an administrative
body, the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency, to be located in Brussels.
The Agreement was opened for signature in Paris on January 14,
1946 and entered into force ten days later! The Paris Reparations
Agreement was and remains fundamental to both reparations and
restitution policy.
First, the Allied claim to German assets in the neutral countries for
reparation purposes rests on the chain of title running from Potsdam
to Allied Control Council Law No. 5 to implementation under the
Paris Reparation Agreement. This was the very heart of the Alliedneutral negotiations.
Second, after its primary function of allocation, the Agreement
took action on the claims and the needs of victims of Nazi persecution. First, it allocated all nonmonetary gold found in Germany to
their relief and resettlement. Then, it established a fund, (S25 million,
a not inconsiderable sum at the time) to be provided out of reparations, for relief and assistance to non-repatriable victims of Nazi persecution. The Agreement provides (Part I. Article 8): "A share of
reparation consisting of all the non-monetary gold ...found in Germany and in addition a sum not exceeding 25 million dollars shall be
allocated for the rehabilitation and resettlement of non-repatriable
victims of German action." 3 Governments of neutral countries were
also to be "requested to make available for this purpose.., assets in
such countries of victims of Nazi action who have since died and left
no heirs." Assistance under this plan was to be "restricted to true
victims of Nazi persecution and to their immediate families." Subparagraph D.(iii) provided such aid to "nationals of previously occupied countries who were victims of German concentration camps or
of concentration camps established by regimes under Nazi influence

2. The following eighteen countries signed on January 14. 1946: Albania.
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark. Egypt. France, Greece,
India, Luxembourg, Netherlands. New Zealand. Norway. South Africa. United
Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia. See Agreement on Reparation from Germany, Establishment of Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, and Restitution of
Monetary Gold, Jan. 14, 1946, 555 U.N.T.S. 69 [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
3. Nonmonetary gold included not only rings, bracelets, and dental inlays, but
other essentially unidentifiable objects of value such as gold coins without numismatic value, silver plate, objets d'artand the like.
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but not including persons who had been confined only in prisoner of
war camps.
The Paris Reparations Agreement thus provided for:
(a) restitution on a sharing basis of monetary gold;
(b) allocation of all nonmonetary gold to surviving persecutees;
(c) a special $25 million fund (out of German external assets
in neutral countries) for former persecutees4 ; and
(d) organizational structures.
The Allied representatives were instructed to take possession of
German external assets in neutral countries (such assets in Allied nations were to be taken by the Allied nations themselves). They were
directed to "request" that neutrals turn over "heirless assets" or their
proceeds to the persecutees, for relief and resettlement.

II. THE WASHINGTON ACCORD
The Allies, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
attempted to carry out the aims of the Paris Reparations Agreement-reparation, restitution, and some, limited, indemnificationin the series of negotiations with Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey, which began with Switzerland in the spring of 1946.
The Swiss negotiations, which are central to the still raging controversy, were confrontational, lasted for months, and terminated in an
exchange of letters that brought satisfaction to neither side. The
Swedish negotiations that followed, though facing many of the same
legal controversies, were brief and resulted in an exchange of letters
which satisfied both sides. The Spanish and Portuguese negotiations,
begun in late 1946, dragged on for years with some small results.
Little came of the talks with the Turks, which expired without result
after a series of inconclusive embassy-level exchanges. The Swiss, as
expected, emphasized their traditional neutrality, which, as they
pointed out, had permitted trade useful to the Allies as well as to the
Germans. Indeed, the Swiss Central Bank had purchased more gold
from the Allies than it had from the Germans. (Not surprising, since
the Allies did not have loot as their only source.) Moreover, Swiss
4. In today's values, this would be about $250 million.

1998]

THE WASHINGTON ACCORD FIFTY YEARs LA TER

neutrality had enabled them to act as the protective power on behalf
of Allied states in enemy countries, performing such useful and helpful tasks as facilitating exchange of diplomats and allowing an important Swiss institution, the International Committee of the Red
Cross, to try to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Hague
Conventions regarding treatment of civilians and prisoners of war.
They strongly denied (as did the other neutrals) that ACC Law No.
5 could affect title to German assets external to Germany or give the
Allies use of them or their proceeds for reparation purposes. If such
assets were to respond to any claims, those would be the claims of
the country in which the assets were located or of its citizens. They
pointed out that Germany had incurred large commercial debts to
Switzerland, Le.Swiss citizens, during the war, and that the clearing
arrangements required that German assets in Switzerland be applied
to satisfaction of this deficit.
The Allies made what seemed to their negotiators to be a telling
rebuttal. They pointed out that the German debt to the Swiss reflected sales of goods and services including munitions, which had
importantly assisted the German war effort, and that there hardly
seemed to be an equity in favor of such debts.
One aspect of the claim to title based on ACC Law No. 5 brought
a measure of irony into the discussions. How were "German assets"
to be defined? It was easily stated by the Allies that the term would
include only property of Germans resident in Germany, excluding
those German nationals who for whatever reason (normal emigration
as well as escape from persecution) lived as permanent residents outside of Germany.5 But persecutees had lived-and many died-in
Germany. It was questioned whether the external assets of such
"German nationals" were excluded. That point was rebuffed by the
Allies, who pointed out that a major class of persecutees-Jewshad in fact been deprived of German citizenship under Hitler. The
point was quickly taken, and the principle of restitution of the
property of persecutees accepted.

5. The question never came up, so far as can be told, of what would happen to
the assets in Germany of a Nazi who had fled. It was assumed, without discussion.
that the assets of such a person would not be exempted.
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There was some, fortunately very brief, discussion about how
much proof of persecution was required in order for a claimant to be
accepted. The matter was dropped as soon as it was raised and as far
as is known was not an issue during implementation of the Washington Accord.
Finally, with the not entirely enthusiastic assent of its Allies, the
American delegation pressed the matter of "heirless" claims-the assets, mostly but not exclusively of persons who had placed their
holdings in Swiss banks or other places of safekeeping, and who had
perished, leaving no known heirs. It was clear that substantial assets,
especially bank accounts, of this nature existed. These accounts, the
Allies insisted, should be accounted for, mobilized, and be used for
the relief and resettlement of survivors or their successors.
The stern Swiss rejection was based on the asserted impossibility
of such a flagrant violation of banking secrecy. It was argued that
this demand, not related to claims for compensation to Allied states,
should not be allowed to jeopardize the entirety of the hard-won prospective Agreement. The Swiss pointed out that agreement, admittedly not completely satisfactory, had been reached on the major Allied objectives of:
(a) liquidation of German external assets;
(b) with Allied supervision (an unprecedented intrusion into
Swiss sovereignty);
(c) reparations (50% of proceeds of German assets);
(d) and restitution of looted gold (that is 250 million Swiss
francs, or about $59 million).
In these circumstances, they stated, to concede on a violation of
the very foundation of Swiss banks reliability-the principle of secrecy and confidentiality-and for a dubious cause-the claim of
refugee organizations of entitlement to the bank accounts of unknown persons-was too much. No concession would be made. The
stubborn Americans insisted. A last minute impasse loomed.
At that moment, the Swiss deputy (Rappard) suggested to his
American counterpart (Rubin) that the Americans could achieve their
objective without compelling the Swiss to violate their principles. A
letter would be signed assuring the Allies that the Swiss would give
"sympathetic consideration" to the requested census and disposition
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of the heirless assets. "Sympathetic consideration," the distinguished
Swiss jurist assured, was the polite diplomatic equivalent to commitment. On that basis, with a handshake, the matter was settled, and
formal letters of agreement were prepared. The Allied delegations
agreed that the American Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals and the British Statutory List would be withdrawn, and Swiss
assets would be unfrozen.6 The Washington Accord was confirmed
by an exchange of letters dated May 25, 1946.!

III. IMPLEMENTATION
The Washington Accord of 1946 has been subjected to much reexamination in recent years, almost all of it strongly critical. The
Swiss now find fault with their own conduct, mainly in relation to
the assistance which they gave to the Germans, even in the last days
of the war, when a German defeat was imminent and certain and a
German military threat to Switzerland implausible. There are reasons
for dissatisfaction with the results embodied in the Washington Accord.
To list a few:
o The Allies, under the Accord, were to receive for the reparations fund only 50% of the German assets in Switzerland.
o That amount was to be collected by a Swiss agency, though the
small Allied Missions in Switzerland were given a not very
detailed right of supervision (which, as even then predicted,
turned out not to be effective).
o The other 50% was to repay Swiss creditors for the supplies
and services that they had furnished to the Germans, right up
to the day of the final surrender, supplies that had undoubtedly
delayed the day of surrender, with each hour of delay taking its
toll of Allied lives.

6. The so-called blacklists contained the names of entities and individuals
with whom any transactions were forbidden and whose properties in the United
States and the United Kingdom had been frozen.
7. The Accord entered into force on June 27, 1946. See Accord on the Liquidation of German Property in Switzerland, May 25. 1946. 13 U.S.T. 118 [hereinafter Washington Accord]; see also Agreement Concerning German Property in
Switzerland, Aug. 28, 1952, 13 U.S.T. 1131 (entered into force Mar. 19. 1953).

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
*

*

[14:61

It was known to the Allies-and known by the Swiss that the
Allies knew-that a vastly larger quantity of gold had passed
through Swiss banks than the amount for which settlement was
made, and, in view both of the knowledge shared by central
bankers and the several public warnings issued by the Allies,
there could not be a credible claim of ignorance of source or of
good faith in Swiss acceptance of looted gold.
Finally, the Swiss would not even make a firm commitment to
take a census of the holdings of those who had perished in
concentration camps-the "heirless assets" now involved in
the current audit into "dormant accounts."

And, as critics correctly point out, the Allies had just triumphed in the war, and had control of almost everything an economy
would need from vital supplies to transport to communications.
Therefore, why concede or compromise? The popular answer is
"the cold war." That is, the Allies were concerned about the Soviet
threat to the West, and felt the need for Swiss cooperation.
There is little doubt that the Swiss were counted on for the rebuilding of war-ravaged Europe. In particular, the British felt the
need for financial assistance from the Swiss, both in reconstruction
and in financial and monetary stabilization. But in early 1946, with
war over for barely a year, there was no widespread fear of the Soviets, except among a relative few. Moreover, there was no feeling
that, of all nations, the Swiss would favor cooperation with the
USSR over their financial, economic, and cultural link to the West.
In any case, in the numerous consultations of the United States delegation with cabinet level American officials during and particularly
toward the close of the negotiations, the "cold war" rationale for being easy on the Swiss was not mentioned, so far as recollection goes.
Much attention has been focused on a letter sent by Senator Harley
Kilgore, then Chairman of the Senate War Mobilization Committee,
to Acting Secretary of State Clayton, in which Kilgore objected to
the signing of the Accord. That letter, unfortunately or not, was sent
after the letters of agreement had been exchanged. A conference had
been held in the Senator's home on May 6 (prior to conclusion of
negotiations) in which Kilgore expressed to the chief and deputy
chief of the American delegation his belief that the deal, while far
from perfect, was a good one, and that the delegation should not risk
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all by holding out for "a few millions more." He noted with strong
approval that the "security" objective of eliminating German control
of external assets had been achieved.
Could more have been obtained by economic pressure on the
Swiss? Perhaps, but the Swiss position made that very doubtful. In
any case, the Allies, especially the British and the French, urgently
desired a return to "normalcy." In the postwar period of 1946, sanctions were next to impossible. The principal threat to the Swiss was
the possible continuation of the Proclaimed List. But the United
States had long before agreed with the British, who were adamant on
the subject, that the United States and British blacklists would be
abolished by June 30, 1946. The American business community was
opposed to any continuation let alone expansion of the list. Nor was
there sentiment in the Treasury Department-the strongest Administration hard-line agency-for such a tactic, especially against British opposition and concern for rebuilding of the world economy. Indeed, a contemporaneous memorandum of conversation with then
Secretary of Treasury Vinson makes clear that Treasury staff had advised Vinson of the impracticability of continuation of the Proclaimed List.9
In the judgment of this writer, the Washington Accord, admittedly
far from perfect, was not only the best achievable at the time, but
meritorious. Its major flaw-attributable in large part to the prevalent
belief in Swiss integrity in adhering to agreements-was in its failure
to provide more effective monitoring and supervision of implementation.

IV. REEVALUATION
Recent events compel a reevaluation of the Washington Accord.
Whether it be the fiftieth anniversary of World War II, or more substantive causes, including the re-thinking of traditional concepts of
neutrality and their place in international law and foreign relations, a

8. The Swiss were apparently unaware of this.
9. Actually, an American interdepartmental policy committee, meeting in

March 1946, was faced with the problem of persuading the reluctant British to
permit a brief extension-to June 30 only-of the previously agreed termination
date of May 8-one year after the end of the war in Europe.
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veritable barrage of inquiry has descended on both the neutrals and
the postwar settlements with them. Blame has been shared among the
neutrals for their conduct in relation to Nazi atrocities and the unsuitable postwar restitution and reparation arrangements. The SwissAllied Washington Accord of 1946 plays a leading role in the discussion.
Despite the acknowledged faults and inadequacies of the settlement, much blame can be laid not to the Accord itself but to its
flawed implementation by Swiss banks and some officials. Although
the Accord may be regarded (then and now) as giving too little to
Allied and refugee claims, it was greeted with hostility in Swiss
banking and Parliamentary circles. Negotiators pointed out to the
Swiss Foreign Office, in apparent apology, that they had yielded-so
far as they did so-only because of the political necessities as seen
by their Foreign Office. (In other contexts, as is the way with negotiators generally, they boasted of how little they had yielded.) The
Accord was submitted for ratification to Parliament. Both Houses
approved it only after vigorous debate, and with substantial opposition. In these circumstances, implementation was reluctant at best.
Obstacles were everywhere. Surveys and censuses were impossible
or, if performed, faulty. Implementation became more a matter of
creating than removing obstacles.
The Swiss were not hard pressed by the small Allied delegations
in Berne. Even if the terms of the Accord itself were influenced little
if at all by cold war concerns, the Allies had little heart to press the
Swiss on the Accord in the midst of the more important struggle
against the Evil Empire.
In reevaluating the Washington Accord, obstacles to full and fair
implementation should be discussed. A major-perhaps the major
aspect of the Accord, since it was central to both security and reparations, was the commitment to identify, liquidate, and distribute the
proceeds of German holdings in Switzerland. Endless questions were
raised by the Swiss on the issue of the rate of exchange that was to
be used. A full and complete census of German-owned properties
was argued to be next to impossible, and in fact seems never to have
been done-despite the vaunted record-keeping skills of the Swiss
(and Germans). When the weary and out-flanked Allied delegations
arrived in a state of frustration in 1952-six years after signing the
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Accord-they agreed to a bulk settlement into the reparations account of an amount generally conceded to be grossly inadequate.
The lack of importance attached by the Allies to Swiss failure to
take a complete count of German assets, and other measures, ranging
from bureaucratic delays to what seems to have been complicity in
cloaking, impeded or frustrated the implementation of the reparation
aspects of the Washington Accord. By the time, these issues arose
for Allied-Swiss discussion, Allied economic policy toward Germany had come full circle. After adoption of the Marshall Plan, the
West, especially the Americans, were feverishly engaged in rebuilding, not eliminating, German economic and industrial power. Morgenthau had been rejected in favor of Marshall; Adenauer was a
treasured ally; and fear of German resurgence was a dim memory.
America was pouring resources into Germany in amounts that
dwarfed possible reparation payments based on German external assets.
From the financial and economic standpoint, accounting for and
obtaining the proceeds of German external holdings in Switzerland
was thus a somewhat anomalous exercise to which little diplomatic
pressure was applied-an attitude that fit well with Swiss reluctance.
Perhaps even more important, the security issue had almost disappeared, except for the continuing search for a few war criminals.
German scientists were eagerly sought out, not to bar them but to encourage their admission to the West-and to keep their technical
skill from the Soviets.
The reparation problems of the Washington Accord were long ago
consigned to the ash heap of historical unconcern. Not so, however,
with what were at one time issues of little governmental interestrestitution and refugee relief.
Implicit in the concepts of restitution and relief are the claims of
individuals. But individuals, at least prior to the United Nations and
its declarations and covenants, had few if any direct rights under international law. The traditional international law mantra is that only
States, not individuals, are "subjects" of international law. Another
mantra affirms the sovereignty of each State, while conceding to
each its right to protect its own nationals from unjust treatment
within another State's sovereign territory. States of course have a legitimate and obvious interest in their own citizens, which they often
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assert. But the interest is traditionally limited to persons who were its
own nationals at the time of the asserted injury. And the individual
may often feel his grievance more deeply than does his government.
The Washington Accord did deal with one restitution issue explicitly-that is, looted gold. The Allies had issued declarations warning
all parties that all gold used by the Germans, after the early 1940s,
had to have been looted. As noted above, the Swiss asserted good
faith acceptance of gold from Germany, pointed out the role of gold
in transnational monetary transactions, and argued (the point seemed
irrelevant to Allied negotiators but was nevertheless pressed) that
they had accepted more gold from the Allies than from the Germans.
A settlement-resented by the Swiss, known to be inadequate by the
Allies-was reluctantly reached.
That settlement has become a focus of demands for revision of the
Accord-both because of the inadequacy of the amount, and because
of the fact that included in the monetary gold to be restituted to central banks through the Tripartite Gold Commission, there was a considerable amount of re-smelted "victims gold." The Paris Reparation
Agreement provided, under Part I, Article 8, that nonmonetary gold
found in Germany should be delivered to the Inter-Governmental
Committee on Refugees. The Tripartite Gold Commission was established to receive the monetary gold, with central banks as the recipient claimants.' ° The recovered monetary gold has never been sufficient to cover the central bank claims. However, in light of the
possibility that "victims gold" was part of the gold originally recovered by the Commission, an American proposal has been put forward
that would pledge undispersed amounts to a relief fund for victims.
Important though it is, gold has not been the principal troubling issue in the present acrimonious revival of the Washington Accord.
What has seized attention and aroused threats of boycotts and sanctions (which have evoked charges of coercion and extortion) has
been the handling of restitution.

10. The Commission was established under Part III of the Paris Agreement,
under which the three Allies (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
were charged with recovering the monetary gold looted by Germany and placing It
in a "pool." Claims and subsequent distribution to claimant countries were adjudicated and executed through the Tripartite Commission.
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It was so self-evident, or so we assumed in 1946, that property
would be restored to its proper owners that almost no reference was
made to the subject in Washington Accord. The only aspect which
was raised as an issue was whether the assets in Switzerland of Jews
or other persecuted persons who were German nationals would be
subject to reparation claims-like other "German" property. That
this would be done was so manifestly ridiculous and immoral that the
suggestion-raised because of the possibility that many "ordinary"
Germans would claim persecutee status-was instantly discarded.
Claimants, it was somewhat naively assumed, would present
themselves and obtain their deposits or monies which came to them
by inheritance. Forced transfers would not be recognized. The process would effect restitution-to the owners, or to their heirs. As to
heirless assets, the property of those whose entire families had been
wiped out, the promised "sympathetic consideration" would result in
a careful accounting and allocation of proceeds to organizations that
would devote them to the relief and rehabilitation of Holocaust survivors. These expectations were badly mistaken.
Taking a census was resisted on the ground of inviolability of
banking secrecy. Banking secrecy, of course, had been "violated" by
the commitment of the Accord to find and liquidate German assets,
with the proceeds to be divided between Allies and Swiss. This point
had small effect. Despite their scruples, in the course of the years
following the Accord, the Swiss banks did make three separate estimates of heirless assets-each succeeding one being slightly higher
than the last, but all considerably less than the estimates of others.
In any case, the defense of the sanctity of banking secrecy lost all
credibility when the Swiss, working out a clearing arrangement with
the Polish Government, agreed to locate and credit to the Polish balance the heirless deposits of the many Polish Jews who had died
without heirs. This agreement, reached in secrecy, caused a furor
when it became known, and was of course inconsistent with the position presented to the Allied delegations and to the appeals of the
Jewish relief organizations, which made many approaches to the
Swiss government and banks.
Worse, claimants who did appear faced obstacles in recovering assets. Many claimants were children of deceased depositors. The circumstances of the war and the Holocaust made the proofs demanded
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by bankers difficult to produce. The need for secrecy in placing
money abroad made documentation understandably scarce. What
existed had often been lost or destroyed. Parents on their way to
death chambers had whispered information to children being smuggled out of concentration camps. Yet bankers refused to conduct
searches of their records to assist claimants, demanded bank books
that had long since been lost. Even demanded certificates from Bergen Belsen and Auswitz.
That these difficulties need not have existed is clear. For example,
similar situations-that is, claimants with proofs faulty by normal
standards-were taking place elsewhere. Many persons sought their
own or their parents' deposits in American banks. So far as can be
told, American-and other-banks responded by searching records
and tracing fragmentary documents.
In summary, the Washington Accord, admittedly deficient in several respects, was frustrated by:
o its failure to obtain monetary gold equal to that transferred to
or through Switzerland to the Nazis;
o failure to account for the "victims gold" included in monetary
gold;
o faulty accounting for and liquidation of German assets in
Switzerland;
o lack of cooperation in identifying and restoring assets of persecuted persons;
" and indifference if not hostility to the heirless property claims.
Of this list, only one-the monetary gold settlement-can be
attributed to the terms of the Accord. The others-which have led to
the current denunciations of Swiss performance and to many unfair
accusations and rethinking of concepts of neutrality-are almost entirely defects of performance, not of text.

V. RECENT EVENTS
Out of the fire-storm of criticism that has engulfed the Swiss
banks and former Swiss actions (importantly denying sanctuary to
many refugees and suggesting that the Germans stamp passports of
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Jews so as to make them easily identifiable) has come a number of
remedial measures.
First and foremost, have been the actions taken by both private and
public institutions in Switzerland. In agreement with the World Jewish Congress and other organizations, the Swiss banks are financing
a major (and expensive) project, under the direction of an international commission headed by former United States Federal Reserve
chairman Paul Volcker, the avowed (and likely to be attained) aim of
which is to identify any heirless assets in Switzerland. The banks
have stated that they will fully comply with the Volcker findings.
The Swiss have themselves constituted a commission of inquiry,
the Berger Commission, which has already issued a preliminary report confirming that the amount of gold that passed into or through
Swiss banks substantially exceeded the figures of the Washington
Accord.
A special fund has been created from Swiss (mainly banking) entities, now amounting to almost $200 million.
Class action law suits against several major Swiss banks and the
Swiss National Bank have apparently been settled by a payment in
two tranches of $1.2 billion. The law suits, based originally on heirless asset claims, were later expanded to include such items as alleged responsibility of the banks for slave labor used by German
companies to which the banks had made loans. The settlement seems
to this observer to be a good one for the claimants. Heirless assets
(which in any case are to be identified by Volcker) are bound to be
much less than the amounts claimed. Major depositors in Switzerland
were from the German Jewish community, which had the most
warning and could transfer holdings elsewhere: many "dormant accounts" were in fact small, forgotten accounts placed in Switzerland
for reasons of tax evasion or refuge from foreign exchange regulations not related to the Holocaust.
Finally, so far as Swiss actions are concerned, a proposal for creation of a multi-billion dollar Solidarity Fund is to be put to a Swiss
referendum. This would be a general humanitarian fund for relief in
many parts of the world, but would include Holocaust victims. The
creation of this fund, as of the time of writing, is doubtful, largely
because of the deep resentment felt in Switzerland at the boycott
threats directed by American state authorities at Swiss banks.
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The Swiss "looted gold" and related issues have also led to inquiry
and responses in other countries-the former neutrals most of all, but
Allied nations as well. Sweden, whose own "Washington Agreement" followed shortly after the Swiss exchange, has conducted its
own reexamination. The accord with Sweden featured much the
same legal positions, but no acrimony against the Allied positions,
and a forthcoming attitude toward the merits of restitution and reparation. Basically, the Swedes undertook to restore looted gold and
make funds available in amounts roughly equivalent to the value of
German assets in Sweden. Their one condition was that these actions
(except as to gold) be viewed a voluntary contribution. Performance
was almost immediate.
Nevertheless, Sweden and others have been reappraising the
situation, and will likely add to what remained of the monetary gold
under the control of the Tripartite Gold Commission. Other neutrals
with whom negotiations were held in the 1940s and after-Spain,
Portugal, and Turkey-may take modest remedial steps, with Spain,
which received a substantial amount of gold in payment for the essential metallurgical product, wolfram, being the more likely.
The dissection of the Washington Accord by the United States
Congress and Executive Branch, and nongovernmental organizations
has also resulted in review of Washington's own performance. On
the moral (as distinct from material) side, we have been reminded of
Washington's refusal to admit the desperate refugees on the German
ship, St. Louis, when they were within sight of Florida-an episode
that has been compared with Switzerland's barring of refugees from
occupied France. It should be noted, however, that Switzerland did
admit many more refugees, in proportion to its population, than any
other nation. This is in contrast to a United States that not only denied entry to the desperate St. Louis refugees, but systematically
failed to fill even the limited immigration quota that was available.
The episode not only demonstrates the wrongness of generalizations
about national traits of character, which have unfairly denigrated "the
Swiss," but is also notable for the conduct of the German captain of
the St. Louis-who insisted that his crew treat its Jewish passengers
with respect and courtesy and who kept his ship at sea for days while
waiting for some nation to provide refuge.

19981

THE WASHINGTON ACCORD FIFTY EA RS LATER

On the material (and moral) side, it resulted in a revival of the
dormant effort to obtain the proceeds of heirless assets in the United
States for relief of survivors. Despite some legislative movement in
the early 1950s, only a minuscule amount (approximately $500,000)
was turned over to the refugees-the remainder being deposited as
German holdings, in the War Claims Fund. This injustice has now
been remedied, by a generous legislative allocation. The United
States example has also been followed by Norway and Great Britain.
Other consequences have followed. Argentina, a neutral until the
final days of the war, has launched a large and international inquiry
into the extent of Nazi activities in that country, which will cover not
only the flight of Nazi funds, indirect as well as possible direct receipt of gold, but also entry of war criminals.
These events have led to an extensive multi- and international exploration, not merely of the Swiss-Allied experience, but of fundamental concepts regarding neutrality, law, morality, and the conduct
of many nations. There can be no doubt that in both the postwar settlements and their implementation (or lack thereof) measures of restitution and material recompense were inadequate.
The revitalization of Holocaust claims against the neutrals should
not overshadow the subject of the major claims against those directly
involved-Germany and Austria-where much has been done. It
was there, and in the countries occupied by Nazi forces, that the
atrocities, as well as the vast majority of looting, took place. With
those states, claims negotiations were conducted under the aegis of
the worldwide Conference on Jewish Material (emphasis added)
Claims against Germany (and its sister Austria counterpart).
Jewish claimant organizations have never, of course, considered
that any financial amount could recompense the human suffering inflicted during the Holocaust period. Indeed, the inception of negotiations in the early 1950s in respect of materials claims were opposed
by some on the ground that such payments were immoral and desecrated the memory of the victims. (In Israel, which received substantial German funds in recognition of the financial costs of receiving
and rehabilitating refugees, the 1953 agreement with the Germans
was almost rejected on moral grounds.) But negotiations since the
early 1950s with Germany and Austria, and with Axis satellite states,
have resulted in extensive recompense for material damage-for loss
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of property, for loss of pensions, and to some extent for lost careers.
These types of direct claims continue to be pressed, reunification
having expanded the possibilities with respect to Germany. Slave labor claims are being directed against former users of slave labor, like
I.G. Farben, and there have been claims for confiscated insurance in
Germany, Austria, and Italy.
Central to claims and defense has been the international law governing neutrality. From the beginning of the 1946 talks, the Swiss
emphasized their long standing neutrality-agreed to by the European powers in the Treaty of Westphalia, confirmed in the 1815
Congress of Vienna. Much editorial and other comment have devolved on the rights of neutrals with both sides in a conflict, with
some pointing to a "positive" aspect of neutrality, that is, the ability
of a neutral state to act as a protecting power, attempting to enforce
the humanitarian purposes of the Hague Conventions and protecting
both civilians and prisoners of war. And there has been discussion of
whether concepts of neutrality are not outmoded in a contest between
good and evil, as between the Nazis and those fighting to preserve
human rights.
The latter point of course assumes that there is an evident and accepted standard by which a choice can readily be made. Choice
would seem to have been easy in the circumstances of World War II.
The same could not confidently be said of choices in the many European wars of succession of the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries,
nor even of World War I, the war "to end all wars." Invocation of the
help of the Lord is customarily made with equal fervor and possibly
conviction of merit on both sides of a conflict. Divine assistance is
especially asked on both sides of religious wars, particularly if what
seems to outsiders to be a minor point of doctrine separates the combatants. Jerusalem is felt by many of the devout to be a holy city, or
at least to contain sacred places; but to which faith divine right bestows it is not a decision an atheist (or a Buddhist) may see as foreordained.
The chief of the Swiss delegation to the 1946 Washington negotiations made, during the talks, a speculative but certainly provocative reference to the possible argument by Hitler that his cause was
the better, as being a good faith attempt to achieve the benefits of a
unified Europe. Less provocatively, many influential Swiss bankers
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felt that banking transactions with Germany were within their clear
rights as neutrals, if not indeed their duty as custodians of international monetary stability. On the other hand, the majority of Swiss
sympathized with the Allies and did much to help refugees.
Swiss neutrality and the transactions with the Germans that it permitted, have been feverishly denounced by many. Alan Hevesi,
Comptroller of the City of New York, said "it is a matter of morality" in rejecting a proffer in settlement of the Swiss banks: doubling
the offer, under threat of boycott, eliminated the asserted immorality.
But certainly, in a broad sense, he was right. The measures being
taken at present do owe much to a sense of morality-not only in
connection with neutrality, but in relation to the moral aspects of
human conduct by anyone, neutral or otherwise.
In point of fact, the fulcrum of the Swiss-Allied negotiations of
1946 and of what has followed had little to do with neutrality. They
had much to do with the universal doctrine of law that stolen property is to be returned. Gold that has been looted, when a defense of
taking in good faith is not available, is by any societal standard of
law to be restored. That is true whether it be gold bars with Belgian
identification on them or bracelets and rings. That, plus the right of a
government, against compensation, to regulate the use of the foreign
assets of its nationals, was and remains the underpinning of the
Washington Accord. Neutrality, though at the epicenter of discussion, is a side issue.
It is for this reason that many of the current measures are moving
forward under international impetus. They have to do with a great
injustice that goes beyond a careful accounting of what has been lost.
That is why the actions taken by the Swiss-whether the funds being
created or the class action settlement-are not limited to amounts in
dormant accounts or other countable assets. Certainly this is the case
for the Solidarity Fund. These are measures that may in part be based
on the point made during the negotiations, that the Swiss had benefited and Swiss democratic values had been preserved by Allied sacrifices, not merely of money but of blood in the struggle against Hitler. Perhaps more, they testify to a welcome Swiss humanitarianism.
Equally, neutrality obviously has little to do with the steps being
taken in many countries to reexamine their own history. At least fifteen states-including the United States-have set up commissions
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of inquiry. The Allies are being asked, and many are consenting, to
put the monetary gold remaining under control of the Tripartite
Commission into relief efforts. The United States has appropriated
some $25 million for the same purposes, in recognition that some
heirless deposits in the United States went into the War Claims Fund.
Britain and Norway have both made contributions to a relief fund.
Argentina instituted a year ago an intensive internationally supervised investigation into the Nazi role in Argentina, which has already
produced extensive reports-some of which dispel the more romantic tales of Nazi submarines and Hitler's escape.

CONCLUSION
The inquiry that began with revisiting the 1946 Washington Accord has thus led to a wide, multinational inquiry-not only on restitution and reparation, but also on issues of morality and neutrality.
It has broadened far beyond the neutrals. It has produced measures of
restitution, rectification and new contribution from neutrals and from
Allies. It has, as it expanded to review the course of events, demonstrated that considerations of self-interest affected the conduct of
all-frequently in distressing ways. The most virtuous sometimes
strayed. Many have repented-and brought at least material benefits
to the victims. And the inquiry goes on-though the "closure" that
all have sought seems, at least for the beleaguered Swiss, to be at
hand.
This episode may result in higher and better standards of human
conduct. One hopes so. For neutrals, and particularly for those who
abstain from judgment as well as from action, it may give pause to
recall that Dante places in the unpleasant vestibule of Hell those
fallen angels whose sin was to abstain from choosing sides and refusing to make a choice.

